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| Thread: VE Day 60th Anniversary |  This thread is pages long: 1 2 · «PREV |
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Consis
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posted May 10, 2005 07:15 AM |
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Edited By: Consis on 10 May 2005
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I Should Point Something Out
One minor note of great significance about Lee. You seem to forget Gettysburg. If I may for just a moment enlighten you on Lee's supposed skill as a general in that battle. An important facet in the leadership of being a general is the ability to command other high-ranking officers. This was Lee's greatest inadequacy on the field of battle. Up until the battle of Gettysburg he had not been subjected to the flamboyant personalities of some of the other more notable southern patrons whom he was supposedly serving. But in great ignorant bombast and southern patriotism, he knew he could not control their usual inability to be patient, wait, and follow orders the way his own soldiers did so artistically in many prior encounters. Thus it was that the Confederate army, mobilized as it was in such great attendance, could not sit idly by whilst Lee looked for the perfect strategy. In fact he wanted to probe the edges as he had done before but he couldn't control the unbridled patriotism of a certain *cough* senator. And so the charge was seen as wholly unorchestrated and ultimately suicidal. Right down the middle it was; through to the center and then the fight for the high ground. It was brutal and completely sad. Both sides fought inexorably for their lives. Some knew each other personally, from one side to the other. It was ultimately the loss of Lee's ability to control his own charismatic captains that led to that charge which ended the American civil war for all time.
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Defreni
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posted May 10, 2005 08:08 AM |
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Wellington did just that. I suppose it's the old debate and point of fact:
~A good General knows his own limits. He either can lead from the high ground or he can't; it doesn't make any difference either or, but luck favors those who are in the right place at the right time. The right place being that which he knows he is good at. The right time being dependent on the right place during an unforeseeable sequence of events. 'As luck would have it...'
Yes, and here is precisely the problem with both MacArthur and Patton. MacArthur broke all orders in the Korean war, thereby dragging China into it, and prolonging it unnecessarily. Fortunately Patton did not have the supreme command over the western allied armies in 1945. Otherwise there are some evidence that he would have tried the same stunt.
Mind you, Im not a big fan of Real-politik, but have much more confidence in elected politician making the decision about war and peace, than some general. Especially if the generals name is Patton (Or MacArthur for that matter).
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Defreni
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privatehudson
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posted May 10, 2005 12:01 PM |
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It was ultimately the loss of Lee's ability to control his own charismatic captains that led to that charge which ended the American civil war for all time.
I beg to differ. It was Lee's own captain's that argued vehemently against "Pickett's charge", not for it. Both his senior corps commander in Longstreet and Alexander who commanded part of Longstreet's artillery made their views abundantly plain, that the result would be slaughter. Ewell was IIRC not very supportive either but it's hard to tell with Ewell given how timid and negative he tended to be throughout the fighting those 3 days. Most historians I've read believe that Lee was suffering from a kind of invincibility complex at Gettysburg and believed his own sides propaganda too much, and was too proud not to attack. In stark contrast to Patton, Montgomery or MacArthur though who tended to blame everyone else for their mistakes, Lee at least accepted he was to blame after the charge fell the pieces. He certainly had problems with some commanders during the campaign, but the roots of those problems lay either in his own orders, or his own strategies, not in his inability to control those officers. Lee's career was one of taking educated risks based on what he believed the enemy would do, he probably believed Pickett's charge would suceed as much as anyone else did, as much as Longstreet didn't.
If Lee's command of his junior officers had a failing in those days of 1863 it was that he was unused to the new corps commanders beneath him, and they were to him. Lee's style of command suited officers like Stuart, Jackson and Longstreet best, especially when working as a team. Ewell for example was not the kind of officer to tell "take that hill if practical" because Ewell had a tendency in the campaign to be very cautious in battle. Jackson on the other hand knew exactly what such an order really meant and would attempt to take the hill come hell or high water.
However, we should not demean the man's talent for the failings in one campaign. Lee was a genius of the first order as proven by other campaigns. Of course he made mistakes, no-one's perfect. I recall a wargames campaign of the 7 days fighting where the players commanded Union forces each. One corps through sheer luck captured Lee and withdrew from battle. My friend (the umpire who controlled the southern army) summed it up well.
"Well, with Lee gone the army wouldn't launch Pickett's charge, but with Lee gone, they probably wouldn't reach Pickett's charge."
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Especially if the generals name is Patton (Or MacArthur for that matter).
Talking of MacArthur, have you read much about the way Australians view him?
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Consis
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posted May 10, 2005 03:17 PM |
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Edited By: Consis on 10 May 2005
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I'm Feeling A Bit Frustrated With You PrivateHudson
I don't know where you get your information from but you've crossed the line in telling me what to think about mr Robert E. Lee. I find it really quite insulting that you or anyone else in this world would believe everything you read especially about my own southern patriot mr Lee. Let me please try to set the record straight for you and the rest of the inaccurate world of gossip. This man had something that no history book could ever fully describe. He had no armor and no shield but he was truly chivalrous to the very end. You are absolutely correct that he accepted the ultimate responsibility for the outcome of the battle. Realistically speaking, the real idiots responsible for "Pickett's charge" were dead or dying. There was no one left to accept responsibility! Of course it was right in line with his honorable character! Now if you'd researched your entire Lee history you'd realize that a charge of this nature would never have been something that Lee would have agreed to. He was trying to convinvce his captains that the enemy was too heavily entrenched and had been sending out probing patrols to check for a weak link in the line. But they wouldn't have it. They had come "this far" and weren't about to waste time trying to play cat and mouse with the enemy. It was true that this battle displayed the largest conglomeration of confederate influencials; that is to say that these captains were each their own notariety from most of the respective southern states. These other men were not, let me repeat that, NOT anywhere near the talent of Lee. They were by and large headstrong and highly thoughtful of their importance within the southern Confederation. They were 100% idiots on the battle field. In fact was partly their immature impatience that brought the civil war to fruition in the first place! The only plausible argument that anyone can make for Pickett's charge is the death of Stonewall Jackson. Had he lived to see that battle then those arrogant morons would have been stayed in their uncontrolled fit of "patriotism". Now there was a man capable of keeping his subordinates in line.
I don't know what's worse: a Briton telling me Lee gave the order for the charge, or one of my own countrymen telling me Lee was a complete loser because he lost the war. And believe me I've heard quite enough of both! On the whole I disagree with the Confederate philosophy but this does not diminish the honor of a man like Robert E. Lee. He was a true American whom knew that you shouldn't resort to guerilla warfare against your own countrymen. It's pure barbarism and only teaches your soldiers how to become more animal and less human.
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privatehudson
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posted May 10, 2005 04:42 PM |
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I don't know where you get your information from but you've crossed the line in telling me what to think about mr Robert E. Lee.
You're perfectly entitled to believe what you like, it doesn't mean it's backed up with unbiased factual evidence though sorry. If informing you of this evidence offends you then maybe you should look at Lee without rose-tinted glasses.
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Realistically speaking, the real idiots responsible for "Pickett's charge" were dead or dying. There was no one left to accept responsibility!
Exactly who are these real idiots? The only man in the enitre army who could order such a multi-corps assault with diversions was Lee, no-one else. Not even Longstreet could command such an attack without Lee's authority being given to it.
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Now if you'd researched your entire Lee history you'd realize that a charge of this nature would never have been something that Lee would have agreed to
Wrong. I suggest you research Malvern Hill for another example where Lee ordered another bloody attack which failed.
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He was trying to convinvce his captains that the enemy was too heavily entrenched and had been sending out probing patrols to check for a weak link in the line. But they wouldn't have it. They had come "this far" and weren't about to waste time trying to play cat and mouse with the enemy.
Longstreet argued vehemently against the attack, not the other way round. He said on that day:
General I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move round the right of Meade's army and maneuver him into attacking us
Lee's reply was short and to the point.
The enemy is there (pointing to the centre of the Union line), and I am going to attack him
Longstreet further objected to the inclusion of Hood and McLaws' divisions in the original plan and it was modified to remove them. When he discovered that the attack would comprise just 15,000 men he said
General I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. In my opinion no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position
Lee refused to budge.
(sourced from time life's book on the battle)
This does not strike me as the actions of a man persuaded by his junior officers, but the actions of a man persuaded by himself despite his junior but most trusted officer. I will endeavour to get more proof that the charge was Lee's idea if you'll do me the decency to listen to it with an open mind.
I myself happen to have great respect for Lee, but I find it preposterous that anyone could believe he was completely perfect. Lee made mistakes, any proper analysis of his career shows that. He was though a genius of a commander, and a fine man. Does that mean he was immune to error though? I myself find Wellington to be a brilliant general, I don't consider him perfect though, I know his failings better than most. Apparently you seem unable to do the same with Lee out of some blinkered view of what patriotism is.
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privatehudson
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posted May 10, 2005 05:24 PM |
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Co-incidentally, if you don't believe timelife, you might believe Douglas Freeman (a southerner from Virginia I might add)
"Weary as Lee must have been of Longstreet's endless contention for the acceptance of his own plan, he listened patiently, and then, once again, told Longstreet that he intended to attack the Federal army where it stood with the three divisions of the First Corps — Hood's, McLaws's, and Pickett's. But Longstreet was not to be silenced. He argued that he had been a soldier all his life, and that he did not believe any 15,000 men could be found who would be capable of storming the ridge. More than that, he insisted that he could not deliver the assault with his full corps. Hood and McLaws, he said, were facing superior forces. They could not attack p108 where they were, he maintained, and if they were withdrawn and employed against Cemetery Ridge, the Federals would pour down from Round Top and get on the flank and in the rear of his corps. His argument was warm and lengthy.
Lee believed that his plan was practicable and that a general assault along the right held out the highest promise of success. His army had never yet failed to carry a Federal position when he had been able to throw his full strength against it. Only when his assault had been delivered with part of his forces — as at Malvern Hill — had he ever failed. But now, in the face of Longstreet's continued opposition, he probably reasoned that if Longstreet did not have faith in the plan it would be worse than dangerous to entrust the assault to his troops alone. Lack of confidence is half of defeat. So, as happened only too often, Lee put aside what he regarded as the best plan and, out of consideration for a subordinate, improvised a second best. He would leave Hood and McLaws where they were and would shift the front of the attack more to the centre. For McLaws's division he would substitute Heth's of A. P. Hill's corps, and in place of Hood he would use two brigades of Pender's division to co-operate with Longstreet's fresh division under Pickett. This would give Longstreet substantially the same effective strength as if he attacked with the whole of the First Corps. It seemed a reasonable thing to do in the circumstances, but, as the event proved, the shift of the attack to the right centre subjected the assaulting column to a fire on both flanks.
That from his biography on Bobby Lee 
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Consis
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posted May 10, 2005 07:49 PM |
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Edited By: Consis on 10 May 2005
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You Know....
I've learned something new about Lee in this particular argument. Here are his own words to Longstreet just before the battle on the second day:
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"Soldiering has one great trap. To be a good soldier you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love. That is....a very hard thing to do. No other profession requires it. That is one reason why there are so very few good officers. Although there are many good men.
We don't fear our own deaths, you and I. We protect ourselves out of military necessity, not fear. You sir, do not protect yourself enough and must give thought to it. I need you. But the point is, we are not afraid to die. We are prepared for our own deaths and for the deaths of comrades. We learn that at the Point. But I have seen this happen: We are not prepared for as many deaths as we have to face, inevitably as the war goes on. There comes a time... We are never prepared for so many to die. Do you understand? No one is. We expect some chosen few. We expect an occasional empty chair, a toast to dear departed comrades. Victory celebrations for most of us, a hallowed death for a few. But the war goes on. And the men die. The price gets ever higher. Some officers... can pay no longer. We are prepared to lose some of us. But never surely all of us. Surely not all of us. But... that is the trap. You can hold nothing back when you attack. You must commit yourself totally. And yet, if they all die, a man must ask himself, will it have been worth it?
I want this to be the last battle, you know General, under this beard I'm not a young man."
There it is. Here he says it and admits he's done with the war in my opinion. Tis sad but not hollow; more like hallowed... yes that's the word I'd use to describe this great man of my country's history. I was born in Austin, Texas you know; a southern lad with southern views. I have never agreed with the Confederates wanting to secede but I have always felt akin to the humanity of their reasoning. He did in fact order the charge though even when I was wrong I didn't feel the slightest bit 'blinkered'. I'd say more upset than some foreigner's description of my home's history.
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privatehudson
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posted May 10, 2005 08:36 PM |
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I'd say more upset than some foreigner's description of my home's history.
I have no idea what you mean
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Khayman
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posted May 10, 2005 09:17 PM |
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Don't let me interrupt the war of historical (in)accuracies, but...
Can you imagine what a logistical feat it must have been for Lee to move the massive (but dwindling) Confederate Army all the way from down south to the fields of Gettyburg in the north? That is in central Pennsylvania, if my geography serves me correctly! Talk about taking the battle to the enemy! Mr. Lincoln must have been peeing his pants in the White House upon hearing the news that the Confederate Army was ABOVE him in Pennsylvania.
Not to throw in any extraneous information, but I do recall reading somewhere that Lee was sick from battle wounds or fatigue, and perhaps that led to his supposed poor judgment at Gettysburg. Just a thought, gentlemen. Let the historical battle resume...
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privatehudson
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posted May 10, 2005 09:26 PM |
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Some have suggested that he suffered a slight heart attack in April or May of 1863 also do to strain. Arguably Lincoln was equally if not more distressed in 1862 when Lee crossed into Maryland with around 50,000 men which sounds small compared to the 100,000 or so strong Army of the Potomac, but given that Lincoln was told by McCellan (the AoP commander) that the union forces were heavily outnumbered and in bad need of reinforcements, Lincoln probably worried then too. McCellan was a good organiser of armies, but a godawful general on campaign and in a battle, far too timid and wasteful.
The thing about Gettysburg was though that unless the south won convincingly and early in the battle, their casualties at the end of day two or three, had the Union army withdrawn would probably have prevented them from continuing onto take Washington anyway. This was especially the case on day three by when the Southern army was low on ammunition, especially for the artillery. By 1863 Washington was ringed with heavy forts and would not have been difficult to defend from attack. The only realistic chance of bringing the North into negotiations had Pickett's charge somehow suceeded would have been via european diplomacy.
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Consis
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posted May 10, 2005 09:34 PM |
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*sigh*
I feel spent. I've had that opinion of Lee for so long that I can't remember when it formed. Perhaps it was nothing more than a gossip passed down by those who still feel strongly that the civil war holds great significance. And all it took was a slight argument to finally urge me to question what I had been brought up to believe. I am not so quick to forget my upbringing, rather I am old enough to know that history is often written by the victor and lamented by the victim. What will I do with myself. I shall have to let it go. I must. Today is quite a depressing day for me.
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privatehudson
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posted May 10, 2005 09:45 PM |
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In the case of the civil war, the history was also written by the defeated. Numerous "parties" came out of the war with regards to Lee's conduct during it, and especially Gettysburg. Lee's staunchest defenders usually blame Stuart, Ewell and Longstreet for the problems that caused the defeat, and each of those generals have their own defenders. Pickett never forgave Lee for "destroying my division" and would always hold it against his C.O. (though in Pickett's defence he stayed in the ANV to it's death at Appamatox despite his animosity and depsite Lee sacking him). Consequently there are a number of different accounts and theories surrounding the battle and it's events, and each concentrates more on set events depending on who they aim to find fault with. In a rather ironic way, Northern accounts and books after the war, by virtue of having no real involvement in the bickering tend to be less biased.
It imagine it really wouldn't be hard to grow up reading the accounts (and books based on the accounts) of those Lee defenders and assume they were correct until you see other evidence, so I wouldn't feel too bad about it. There's a degree of truth in most things, Longstreet and Ewell did perform badly in the battle also and could be argued to have contributed to the defeat almost as much as Lee's mistakes, so it's not all false.
AFAIK and to his credit, Lee never wrote any serious amount on the war or Gettysburg, so I don't think he ever especially blamed anyone else, which is well within the man's character. That would be in stark contrast to Napoleon who's memoirs regularly blame others for his own mistakes.
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