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| Thread: Neo-conservatism and Christian Zionism -- Dangerous influences on Bush Policy? |  This thread is pages long: 1 2 · NEXT» |
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Peacemaker
Honorable
Supreme Hero
Peacemaker = double entendre
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posted September 02, 2004 05:51 PM |
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Neo-conservatism and Christian Zionism -- Dangerous influences on Bush Policy?
As referenced in bort's Why George Bush should not be re-elected thread, I am providing a couple of articles addressing the concerns about Bush international policy that many have held for a long time.
http://www.amconmag.com/03_24_03/cover.html
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2003/0312apocalypse.php
For you international members who may not be familiar: Pat Buchanan is a notoriously conservative commentator here in the United States. As I have pointed out in the past, all the Bush-bashing that is going on is not simply a tactic from the American Left. A growing number of conservatives are becoming disgruntled with the man's hidden influences, platform and unclear (at best) agenda as well.
Now while the old addage goes "where there's smoke there's fire" frequently holds true, my training and experience in the law and in politics lead me to the preliminary conclusion that "where there's smoke there's a reason to investigate further the cause of the smoke."
Particularly in a political battle as bitter as the one at hand, what you frequently find is "where there's smoke there's a smokescreen."
As for me with respect to these issues, I am not convinced, but I am highly suspicious and alarmed that the more I look, the more flickerings of flame I begin to see.
I urge you all to look deeper into this for yourselves with as objective a mind as possible.
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Peacemaker
Honorable
Supreme Hero
Peacemaker = double entendre
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posted September 04, 2004 12:17 AM |
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I can't seem to get the URL on this one to work, so I have reprtinted here in its entirety.
_______________________________________
rls policy paper 2/2003
Updated and fully revised, May 2003
Impressum rls – policy paper of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung • Franz-Mehring-Platz 1 • 10243 Berlin
Tel. 49 (0) 30/44 31 01 27 Fax 49 (0) 30/44 31 01 22 • E-Mail: info@rosalux.de • www.rosalux.de
RAINER RILLING
»American Empire« as Will and Idea
The new Grand Strategy of the Bush
Administration
America has no empire to extend
or utopia to establish
G. W. Bush, 2002
We don’t seek empires,
we’re not imperialistic. We never have been
D. Rumsfeld, 28 April 2003
Now really, the United States
is certainly not an empire
J. Fischer, 2003
What is needed is a new kind of imperialism
R. Cooper, advisor to Tony Blair, 2002
______________________________________________
A new Grand Strategy for a New World Order is in the making. Its central idea is to protect global capitalism through American Empire. It encompasses unrivalled military superiority, the ability to wage preventive wars and a new justification of the global sovereignty of the USA.
The new division of the world
The terror attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September
2001 was a »transformational moment« (Jessica
T. Mathews) that focused and expedited the conceptual
thinking and politics of the political class in the USA –
after all it found itself under direct physical threat for
the first time. The process came to a tentative conclusion
with the paper »National Security Strategy of the
United States of America« (NSS), which was published
on 17 September 2002. The text in the style of a political
manifesto articulates the current US administration’s
understanding of power politics and the ensuing conception
of a New World Order. It was put to a first
test in the latest war on Iraq. The »transformational
moment« was transformed into an »imperial moment«.
According to the preface to the NSS, signed by George
W. Bush, the long struggle of the last century between
freedom and totalitarianism ended with a »decisive victory
for the forces of freedom«. What prevailed is »a
single sustainable model for national success: freedom,
democracy, and free enterprise« and an unequivocal role
of the USA in this blueprint of the world. »Today, the
United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military
strength and great economic and political influence.«1
This assessment of a qualitatively new disparity of
power can also be heard outside the USA – as early as the
beginning of 1999 the then French foreign minister
Hubert Védrine spoke of the »hyperpower« USA2 – and,
of course, above all within the USA itself. For the liberal
historian Paul Kennedy, author of The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers, »Nothing has ever existed like this
disparity of power; nothing.«3, and at the beginning of
2003 James Kurth summed it up in the influential neoconservative
journal The National Interest: »The first
decade of the 21st century, like the first decade of the
20th, is an age of empire. A hundred years ago, however,
there were many empires (...) Today, there is only one
empire – the global empire of the United States.« 4 Tony
Judt described this disparity of power in the New York
Review of Books as a new global inequality: »Our world is
divided in many ways: rich/poor; North/South; Western/
non-Western. But more and more, the division that counts
is the one separating America from everyone else.«5 And
(p. 2)
for some, even Europe suddenly finds itself in a different
situation: »Welcome to the rest of the world.«6
In order to consolidate this lead on all other powers in
the world, a new strategy, global in scope, was developed
starting in 1989. During the second Bush administration,
it became gradually more audible in the domestic
aftermath of the »War on Terror« and was reflected
in the National Security Directive of 17 September
2002. The National Security advisor responsible for it,
Condoleeza Rice, compared this development in April
2002 with the inception of the containment strategy
directed against the Soviet Union after World War II.
The players
This process was directly supported by a group of neoconservative
intellectuals from think tanks and strategic
planning institutions as well as policy-makers from the
military. At the beginning of the 1970’s they agreed in
their criticism of détente and in the 1980’s under Reagan
they began to climb the ladder of power. In the first
Bush administration they attained a minority position in
the military executive, then finally achieved a hegemonic
majority status in the second Bush administration.
Subsequently they also asserted this position in the
Republican Party in an alliance with the Christian Right,
which is firmly anchored in the South of the USA, with
the radical market ideologists and the classical, more or
less socially conservative Republican mainstream Right
(»compassionate conservatism«).
In the course of 2002 they dominated the foreign policy
debate in the USA. They outlined the key military
policy aspects of the new Grand Strategy, incorporated
them into an optimistic view of the state of the US economy
and in 2002 established themselves as the vanguard
of the new non-partisan movement calling for
war. In record time they got nearly the whole foreign
policy elite of the USA as well as – in an unparalleled
political alliance – the opposing forces in Congress to
rally around their project, which oscillates between
hegemonic and imperial dominance of the USA. For
many it directly picked up where Reagan had left off.
William Kristol, one of the most influential players in
the neo-conservative field, summed up this dramatic
change in 2003 in the words: »The members of the President’s
foreign policy team have all become Reaganites.
«7
But the members of this group under-estimated the
dynamics of the opposition outside Congress to the war
in Iraq and the danger of dissidence within the ranks of
the military. They also failed to get the majority of people
of other countries behind the project of American Empire
– with the exception of Israel, the majority in even
those countries who belonged to the »coalition of the willing
« was against the war of the USA. On the domestic
front, this shift went hand in hand with a marked shift of
power from the legislative to the executive and the reorganisation
of activist »Big Government« under the banner
of »internal security« (»homeland security«) the likes
of which had not been seen in half a century.
The rhetoric, conception and strategy of this group are
nothing if not radical. Their goal is to break away from
the general strategic political consensus that had prevailed
among the dominant US elites for decades. They
draw their dynamics from the single-minded mobilisation
for war – »We are in a world war. We are in World
War Four« (as the former CIA director James Woolsey
put it on 24 July 2002). Their tactical promise: the new,
technologically revolutionary wars that the USA would
wage would be a walkover. Their dynamic political core
is an alliance of Reaganite-minded military and nationalistic
neo-conservatives. Many of them have ties to
the armaments and oil industries.8 Within the Bush
administration this power micro-network forms clusters
around the Vice-President, in the Pentagon, the National
Security Counsel as well the Departments of State and
Justice. Members of this alliance are
• Paul Wolfowitz, the intellectual who calls the shots,
from 1989 till 1993 Under-Secretary of Defense for
Policy under the current Vice-President Dick Cheney,
since March 2001 Deputy Secretary of Defense under
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld;
• Dick Cheney, Vice-President, who began his career
under Rumsfeld in the Nixon era and stems from the culture
of the »corporate Washington-insider class« (J.M.
Marshall). His wife Lynne Cheney held a top position at
the huge US armaments concern Lockheed Martin until
2001; she is also well-positioned in the neo-conservative
think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI);
• Richard Perle, in the Reagan administration 1981-
1989 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, until March 2003 head of the highranking
Pentagon advisory council Defence Policy
Board, then forced to resign;
• William Kristol, the son of the influential neo-conservative
theoretician Irving Kristol,9 former chief-of-staff
(p. 3)
of Reagan’s Vice-President Dan Quayle, a regular commentator
on the ABC News programme ›This Week‹ and
editor-in-chief of the neo-conservative opinion-maker
»The Weekly Standard« (circulation ca. 60,000) published
by Rubert Murdoch;
• Donald Rumsfeld, 21st and 13th Secretary of Defense
of the USA, previously chief-of-staff in the White House
and NATO-ambassador of the USA. Together with Perle,
Wolfowitz, Cheney and Kristol, Rumsfeld forms the core
of this Reaganite neo-conservative alliance;
• I. Lewis Libby, in the first Bush administration under
Cheney Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy;
in the second Bush administration he held the central
position of Vice-President Cheney’s chief-of-staff;
• Zalmay Khalilzad, worked closely with Paul Wolfowitz
under Reagan and George Bush Sr. resp. his
Secretary of Defense Cheney and in the second Bush
administration became commissioner for Afghanistan
and later Iraq;
• John R. Bolton, former Vice-President of the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) and on the advisory board
of the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, is
Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security at the Department of State;
• Elliott Abrams, formerly Reagan’s Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights and then Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs – at the time deeply implicated
in the Iran-Contra affair, now Senior Director for
Near East and North African Affairs on the National
Security Council;
• Douglas Feith, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy,
long-standing collaborator of Richard Perle;
• Stephen J. Hadley, now Deputy National Security
Advisor in the White House; as Assistant Secretary of
Defense he worked for Wolfowitz when the latter was at
the Pentagon under Dick Cheney. He is a member of the
Defense Policy Board;
• Eliot Cohen, in the first Bush administration on the
planning board of the Pentagon and then a member of
Rumsfeld’s Defense Policy Board under Perle;
• Eric Edelman, the security advisor to Dick Cheney;
• Dov Zakheim, the most important »keeper of the purse«
in the Pentagon (Under-Secretary for Comptroller);
• Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, who earned his first
merits as Henry Kissinger’s Special Assistant and then
under Reagan resp. the first Bush administration held
several positions at the Department of State and the
National Security Council;
• William J. Schneider, chairman of the Defense Science
Board of the Pentagon, under Reagan Under-
Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and
Technology;
• Stephen Cambone, in the first Bush administration responsible
for strategic defense policy, then in the second
Bush administration he headed the Pentagon’s Office of
Program, Analysis and Evaluation;
• Thomas Donnelly, (Project for the New American
Century [PNAC]), in the meantime employed at Lockheed
Martin;
• Robert B. Zoellick, worked at the Department of State
in the first Bush administration, in the second Bush
cabinet he is responsible for trade;
• Bruce Jackson from the armaments concern Lockheed
Martin is supposed to have been instrumental in the
draft of the loyalty declaration some countries of »New
Europe« addressed to the US, plays a key role in the
establishment of US power positions in Eastern Europe;
• Robert Kagan, in Brussels at the think tank Carnegie
Endowment, was also George Schultz’ speech-writer
and is considered to be one of the most influential promoters
of the concept of »American Empire«.10
Members of this network are present in many journalistic,
political and organisational contexts, often in association
with others such as the President’s brother Jeb
Bush, or William J. Bennett, Francis Fukuyama, Fred C.
Ikle, Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Stephen P.
Rosen, Samuel P. Huntington, Richard Armitage, Richard
V. Allen, Gary Bauer, Midge Decter, Jeane Kirkpatrick,
Charles Krauthammer etc.
The members of this power micro-network have a great
deal in common: the political career, of the same generation,
but above all the ideological orientation, involvement
in key political projects, wealth and similar or
even the same institutional networking. Before they
could position themselves in the institutions and power
structures of the Bush administration, this group worked
co-operatively in nearly a dozen think tanks that were
intensely involved in the development of strategic concepts
in the 1990’s and frequently financed by the same
foundations. Among these are the Hoover Institution on
war, revolution and peace at Stanford University, the
Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Project
for the New American Century (PNAC), founded in
1997 in the »Reaganite spirit«; the American Enterprise
Institute (in whose building the PNAC resides);
the Center for Security Policy (CSP), founded in 1998,
and its advisory board NSAC, which developed into a
central meeting-place for Reaganite politicians and
ideologists in the 1990’s and together with the AEI provided
dozens of key figures to the Bush administration;
in addition, the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq
(CLI), the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), the Jewish Institute for Security Affairs,
(p. 4)
Empower America, the National Institute for Public
Policy and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
Several neo-conservative educational institutions (Paul
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS]
and the John M. Olin Center for Strategic Studies) also
play an important role in this network.
Characteristic for the whole network is its powerful
presence in some of the national media such as the Wall
Street Journal, Fox News, the Washington Times and the
New York Post as well as periodicals such as Public
Interest, National Review, National Interest, The New
Republic, Insight, Frontpage, First Things and Commentary
Magazine. A key position is held by Rupert
Murdoch’s News Corporation, to which the Fox News
Network, the New York Post and the Weekly Standard
belong. »Lots of people at Fox have supported Bush’s
policies. They have earned it that they and Murdock
himself get a little notice.«11 The network and its institutions
are financed primarily by foundations, which to
some extent in the Reagan era, but above all in the
1990’s carried out a carefully calculated extreme rightwing
funding policy. Among them are above all the USfoundations
Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation, the
John M. Olin Foundation, the foundations of the Koch
Family, but also the Scaife-Foundations, the Castle
Rock Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation,
as well as individual financiers such as Bruce Kovner,
chairman of the Caxton Corp., Roger Hertog of
Alliance Capital Management or Conrad Black, chairman
of Hollinger International Inc. (Richard Perle
belongs to its board of directors). The financial power of
these foundations is considerable: in the 1990’s Richard
Mellon Scaife was among the 50 wealthiest private persons
in the USA, Koch-Industries are the second largest
private enterprise in the USA.12 »It’s a small world,«
said William Kristol to characterise this world of neoconservatism. 13
The strategy and its basic components
Development of the assessments and objectives
In the past half-century the USA has followed a twofold
objective, »to make the world safe for capitalism»14 und
»to ensure American primacy within world capitalism.»
Making the world secure meant a fundamental frontal
confrontation with non-capitalistic movements and
social orders, but ensuring American primacy meant
above all containing and breaking up competing candidates
for hegemony in the Eurasian heartland in a »long
war« (Phillip Bobbitt) from 1917 till 1989. In the confrontation
with the Soviet Union this dual objective of
safeguarding capitalism and American hegemony were
two sides of the same coin. As the »liberal hegemonic
power« the USA operated through a set of multilateral
institutions that at the same time conveyed, legitimised
and disguised the military dominance. In addition, there
was a second set of »Western-American« values that
laid claim to universal validity. After 1989 the military,
technological and economic power of the USA was on
the rise, but even at the beginning of the 1990’s in a
debate in the journals International Security and Foreign
Affairs what was called the »unipolar moment«
after the collapse of the USSR15 did not change the predominant
assessment that the new unrivalled superiority
of the USA was still subject to historical and realpolitical
limitations. For this reason during the Clinton
administration the strategic options of »liberal multilateralism
« (Ikenberry), of soft power and the limited
use of military means of force were basically retained.16
The main priority was to initiate, support and control the
capitalist transformation processes in the state-socialist
countries and to slowly fill the power vacuum that had
emerged. The focus was on the economy.
Long before 9/11 a competing option had existed that
increasingly gained influence. It is reflected in the
report »Rebuilding America’s Defense«, published in
2000 by the neo-conservative »Project for the New
American Century«.17 It gives a description of the new
global constellation that was to become the hegemonic
blueprint for interpretation after September 2001: »Over
the decade of the post-Cold-War period, however,
almost everything has changed. The Cold War world
was a bipolar world; the 21st century world is – for the
(p. 5)
moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with America as
the world’s ›sole superpower.‹ America’s strategic goal
used to be containment of the Soviet Union; today the
task is to preserve an international security environment
conducive to American interests and ideals. The military’s
job during the Cold War was to deter Soviet
expansionism. Today its task is to secure and expand the
›zones of democratic peace;‹ to deter the rise of a new
great-power competitor; defend key regions of Europe,
East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve American
pre-eminence through the coming transformation of
war made possible by new technologies. From 1945 to
1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for a single,
global war that might be fought across many theaters; in
the new century, the prospect is for a variety of theater
wars around the world, against separate and distinct
adversaries pursuing separate and distinct goals. During
the Cold War, the main venue of superpower rivalry, the
strategic ›center of gravity,‹ was in Europe … the new
strategic center of concern appears to be shifting to East
Asia.«18
The report summarised this view of a »unipolar 21st
century« in a handy table at the bottom of this page.
Cold War
Security system: Bipolar
Strategic goal: Contain Soviet Union
Main military mission(s): Deter of Soviet Expansionism
Main military Potential: global war across many theater
Focus of strategic competition: Europe
21st Century
Security system: Unipolar
Strategic goal: Preserve Pax Americana
Main military mission(s): Secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war
Main military threat(s): Potential wars spread across globe
Focus of strategic competition: East Asia
The attacks of 11 September 2001 did not really change
any part of the two fundamental objectives (»safeguarding
global capitalism in exchange for American hegemony
«), but three options for taking action came to the
fore that reflected the change in priorities:
• Where there are no longer competing hegemonic
powers, it is a matter of intervening to prevent their
emergence in the first place. The task is no longer
»deterrence« of a competitor, adversary or enemy, but
rather to nip the emergence of such a competitive situation
in the bud.
• Security must be exported to zones in which new globalising
capitalism is still »insecure« or unstable.
• With terrorism finally becoming a global phenomenon
that poses a new direct threat to the USA as the primary
capitalist power, a global projection of military power
becomes equally compelling.
9/11 influenced the methodology of solving these tasks
and their legitimisations. On the one hand, the road to a
policy of mass mobilisation by means of bellicose rhetoric
became accessible. This made the use of military
force as an instrument of foreign policy and coercive
diplomacy appear normal and compared with hegemonic
rhetoric ever more imperial rhetoric came to the
fore. On the other hand, the use of risk-reduced war technology
had become a real possibility, some of which had
already been tested in the wars of the 1990’s (Iraq, Yugoslavia),
and this made a global military power projection
of the USA possible in the long run. Finally, with the
»war against terrorism« a new lever had been created to
bring regional powers (Russia, China) into the fold. 9/11
associated the situation of war with an understanding of
the USA now being an openly revisionist power that
strives to change the international system in order to
solve the three tasks outlined above. From now on, the
use of US military power is not to be reactive and
passive, but rather active and offensive – »our best defense
is a good offense«, as formulated in the NSS.19
The assessments and strategies of the Bush administration
drew conclusions from the situation after 1989 and
2001 – and they became a power factor. Gradually, by
the autumn of 2002, their advocates were able to implement
them as the decisive factors (up till then).
1. Directly after the attack on the World Trade Center,
the reaction of the US administration concentrated only
on the battle (»war«) against terrorist groups that it suspected
to find in over 60 countries. A decisive factor in
opening up options for action was die definition of the
situation which followed directly after the attacks. They
were not characterised as »crimes«, but rather as »war«
against a global enemy who made a fundamental political
distinction possible: »either you are with us, or you
(p. 6)
are with the terrorists«20. From this moment Bush founded
his presidential legitimisation on his leadership in war
and the virtues and values it invoked: »We have found
our mission« (Bush). This mission was the victory in
war. But war forces partners as well as competitors to
choose between support and opposition.
2. Neither Cheney nor Rice nor Bush had Iraq on their
agenda – but Rumsfeld,21 Perle and above all Wolfowitz
did; the latter most clearly recognised that the threat to
security through terrorism and geopolitical empowerment
overlapped, and he jumped into the topical gap
between them. Wolfowitz was able to make the most
essential contribution to focussing the planning of these
objectives; two days after 11 September he declared that
the USA would be »…ending states who sponsor terrorism
« (›PBS-Frontline‹). Especially since the beginning
of 2003, more voices have been raised who do not limit
the »imperial oversight« (Max Boot) of the USA to Iraq,
but also include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria (Boot) and
Libya (Bolton). Perle made a case for »regime change«
in Syria and Iran (through internal revolts) and Libya
(where pressure from the outside is needed).
3. In his address on the State of the Union in January
2002, Bush extended the legitimacy of the use of military
means against terrorist organisations to include
states (»axis of evil«) that threaten the USA with weapons
of mass destruction regardless of any connections with
terrorist groups. Both connotations – to weapons of
mass destruction and to terrorism – picked up the widespread
rhetoric of the Clinton administration on »rogue
states«.22
4. In April 2002 the President declared the »regime
change« in Iraq to be a military objective – in strategic
documents of the 1990’s such talk about »regime
change« had not explicitly played a role, but, of course,
the USA had always been trying to bring it about.
5. In his fundamental programmatic speech at West
Point Military Academy in June 2002, Bush declared
that the former doctrines of deterrence, containment and
balance of power were no longer sufficient. He emphasised
the ideas of prevention (»pre-emptive action«) and
intervention. From now on, he said, »We must take the
battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the
worst threats before they emerge«23. »Pre-emptive
action«, »regime change« and »disarmament« have
become buzz words of the rhetoric of the Bush administration.
6. Finally the claim of the USA to global military sovereignty
was formulated, which is regarded as the key to
the reconstruction of a new international regime that
guarantees security hegemonically mediated by stability.
The overriding objective is not the defense of the territory
of the USA or the battle against terrorist groups
or states, but rather retaining and consolidating the
inequality between the USA and the rest of the world by
preventing the emergence of hegemonic competitors
and perfecting the world-wide assertion of the American
dominated model through »export of security« (Barnett).
It is a matter of safeguarding the »functioning
core« of the hegemonic structure and the gradual closure
of the »gaps«.24 This is the only way to simultaneously
ensure that no military attack can be launched
against the USA (»homeland«) and that the paradox
tie between vulnerability and invincibility can be dissolved.
A USA »beyond challenge« (Bush, NSS) is the
concept in the face of which all other political objectives
pale. If this strategy of reducing the commitment
of the USA to international alliances and global groups
becomes part of power politics, then the USA positions
itself against the rest of the world.
Military superiority
The first means to achieve this objective is to guarantee
unrivalled military superiority. On the domestic front
(p. 7)
this requires a build-up of national potential: armaments,
strengthening the military and the culture of the
military. In terms of foreign policy it means preventing
the emergence of military and political competition by
all necessary means. As early as February 1992 the draft
of the Pentagon’s »Defense Planning Guide« for 1994-
1999 stated: »Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence
of a new rival, either on the territory of the
former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on
the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.«
The USA, the document declared, »must maintain the
mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from
even aspiring to a larger regional or global role«.25 Now
as then this document was understood as »the doctrine
of a world dominated by Washington«.26 The NSS,
published over a decade later, underscores this objective:
»Our forces will be strong enough,« it states, »to
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military
build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power
of the United States.«27 In an interview on the Public
Broadcasting Network the national security advisor
Condoleeza Rice put it more bluntly: »But if it comes to
allowing another adversary to reach military parity with
the US in the way that the Soviet Union did, no, the US
does not intend to allow that to happen, because if it
happens, there will not be a balance of power that
favours freedom.«28 Consistent with this, the so-called
»threat-based« military planning is replaced by a »capabilities-
based approach«, according to which armaments
and military positioning should be designed to
counter any conceivable military action by any conceivable
adversary at any conceivable time. »Our challenge
in this new century is a difficult one: to prepare to
defend out national against the unknown, the uncertain,
the unseen and the unexpected.« (D. Rumsfeld on 31
January 2002).29 This armaments and military policy has
been dubbed the sum of all fears-approach.
Preventive wars
The second element of this policy is the doctrine of
»pre-emption« – and, above all »prevention«. Whereas
pre-emption is an action legitimised by international law
when an attack is demonstrably, hence practically without
a doubt, imminent or has already taken place, the idea of
prevention waives these conditions of the impending
attack being beyond all doubt and really demonstrable.
The criterion of the imminence of a threat which establishes
the permissibility of a »preventive« action according
to international law is rejected; terrorist attacks are
not publicly announced beforehand and the preparations
are not visible, hence such imminence of a threat does not
exist in fact and therefore cannot be recognised.
Hitherto the option of a preventive war had only been
mentioned behind the scenes in the USA and was seldom
articulated publicly. Examples of this were threatening
to use nuclear weapons against North Korea or the
justifications of the cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan
or Sudan under Clinton. Under Bush both options were
upgraded at the expense of the options containment and
deterrence, and the difference between pre-emption and
prevention was blurred in favour of expanding the idea
of prevention. Now preventive war actions are explicitly
permitted. They are considered permissible when
they are military attacks on terrorist groups, against states
supporting them and against states that either are
already in possession of weapons of mass destruction or
in the process of gaining or even just striving to gain
possession of them. After 9/11 there was a massive
increase in calls for a policy of prevention, the NSS is
worded accordingly.30 Preventive war becomes an »operative
idea«.31
The reference to the »global war on terror« to justify
preventive war has been highly successful and offers
five openings for military action:
1. When there is reference to terror that could not be
identified beforehand, the military action is uncoupled
from the real actions of an enemy. The idea of selfdefence,
at the root of the concept of pre-emption, is
abandoned. What used to be regarded as the last resort
becomes the norm – striving for a »license for permanent
preventive war«32. The high insecurity of information
and decision-making, hence the danger of destabilisation
that characterises a policy of prevention is not
under discussion here.
2. When there is talk of »war«, the idea of prevention
can be inserted into the traditional model of war with its
whole gamut of violent measures. By shifting legitimi-
(p. 8)
sation of military action to apply to states that support
terrorists, the doctrine could be incorporated into military
policy traditionally focussed on enemy states. The
Nuclear Posture Review, formulated in January 2002,
allows nuclear weapons to be used against states
(»rogue states«) that themselves do not possess nuclear
weapons but are only suspected of developing or trying
to gain possession of such weapons.33
3. When reference is made to the globality of terror (»60
states«), the spatial restriction of military action is abandoned:
the license to wage preventive war is valid worldwide.
Since this new quality of terror, against which war
is being waged, is a global phenomenon, the Rubicon to
a global claim to sovereignty has been crossed: The USA
is supposed to have the singular right to intervene everywhere
in the world – including »pre-emptive«, »anticipatory
«, »anti-access-denial« military action.
4. In the debate after 9/11, preventive military intervention
has been detached from the original security and
military legitimisations; this also distinguishes the politics
of the Bush administration from its predecessors.
And a hardly audible parallel discussion emerges:
taking precautionary, hence preventive measures to hinder
a presumptive global rival from emerging – the concept
is to wage preventive war so that no new challenge
can arise, safeguarding hegemony instead of peace.
5. Where limitation of war is breached in this manner,
there is danger that another dam will burst as the result
of the asymmetry of such military actions: it facilitates
the connection to the classical waging of civil war that
ignored limitations (such as the differentiation between
combatants and non-combatants).34
Global sovereignty
Imperial sovereignty?
The third element of the new Grand Strategy is, above
all, the idea of an exclusive right to preventive military
intervention everywhere in the world. The strategy of
preventive war (pre-emption), understood as expanding
the paradigms of deterrence and containment, means
transition to a policy of prevention based solely on the
sovereignty of the USA. The concept behind this is that
in a future world order the USA alone has the right to
sovereignty that can be realised on a global scale: »Yet
the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions
of others.« (Bush)35 The meaning of this concept
of global sovereignty is that the USA lays down unilateral
rules on an international basis (e.g. alliances and
bloc formations), formulates universally valid objectives
(»expand liberty«), determines what constitutes a
crisis (»state of emergency«) and differentiates between
friend and foe and then decides on the use of force.
Alone the USA has the capability to use force everywhere
in the world, hence in future its military presence
will not be limited to North America, Europe and
Northeast Asia: »To contend with uncertainty and to
meet the many security challenges we face, the United
States will require bases and stations within and beyond
Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary
access arrangements for the long-distance deployment
of U.S. forces.« (NSS, p. 29). Only the USA is capable
of disciplining neo-liberal global capitalism. At the
most, it enters into temporary, limited alliances between
unequal partners. The World Order at stake here is not a
common undertaking of great powers, but rather the
result of military hegemony of the USA. The USA is the
system administrator of globalisation.36 It possesses the
eminent right to restrict the sovereignty of other nationstates
and intervene as it sees fit. The Director of Policy
Planning at the US State Department Richard Haass
puts it this way: »What you're seeing from this Administration
is the emergence of a new principle or body of
ideas – I'm not sure it constitutes a doctrine – about
what you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sovereignty
entails obligations. One is not to massacre your
own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any
way. If a government fails to meet these obligations,
then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty,
including the right to be left alone inside your
own territory. Other governments, including the United
States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism,
this can even lead to a right of preventive, or
peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation
if you have grounds to think it's a question of
when, and not if, you're going to be attacked.«37
Hegemonic law
»This new approach is revolutionary« in the opinion of
Henry Kissinger, who adds blunt criticism: »Just as the
willingness of the USA to ›justified preventive attacks’‹
is in full contradiction to modern international law.«
Such a conception violates the NATO-Pact and the
(p. 9)
regulations of the UN. Article 51 of the UN-Charta permits
the use of force by a state only when an attack is
taking place or is imminent. Hence, this is not a matter
of hegemonic unilateralism, but rather of enforcing it by
means of the breach of law.38 The risklessness resulting
from military superiority makes rulelessness a temptation.
The erosion of the potential of international law to
limit wars continues at a dramatic pace since numerous
exceptions have been introduced in the past years:
prevention of humanitarian catastrophes (Yugoslavia),
protection from terrorism (Afghanistan), or even safeguarding
vital resources (NATO-strategy 1999). The
USA lays claim to a special status others are not entitled
to. This marks a fundamental transition from a unipolar
hegemonic to a unipolar imperial system, rejection of
the norm of equality on which international law is
based. It is a step down the road back to an era when
state sovereignty meant the unfettered sovereignty to
wage wars.
Policy of devaluation
The USA rejects extensive ties to international alliances
and especially to the UN resp. to concepts of multilateral
conflict management as a restriction of its freedom of
action. The articulated claim to global sovereignty
(»freedom from attack and freedom to attack«) includes
the devaluation of international ties via multilateral treaties,
international institutions and alliances and the
enforcement of American law on an international scale
as far as possible. There are numerous statements devaluing
international institutions from neo-conservatives in
the Bush camp. A statement by Bolton illustrates this:
»There is no such thing as the United Nations (…) if the
UN Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it
wouldn't make a bit of difference.« And: »There is an
international community that can be led by the only real
power left in the world, and that is the United States,
when it suits our interests and when we can get others to
go along.«39 Bush himself expressed his fear that the
Security Council is »a hollow debating society«40. Richard
Perle also wrote that the »security through international
law, guaranteed by international institutions« is a
»liberal vanity« lying in »intellectual ruins«41. The
destabilisation of international security regimes is not
only accepted, it is actively pursued with the goal of
nullifying the historical achievement of the UN-Charta
limiting war and making the self-commitment of the
USA to international law conditional. Regulations of
multilateral armaments control were weakened: the
ABM-Treaty was terminated in December 2001,
attempts to reinforce the Bio-Weapons Accord broke
down at the 5th Verification Conference due to the resistance
of the USA42 .
Empire Reloaded
The new grammar
This transition from a unipolar hegemonic to a unipolar
imperial system was tersely summed up by Stephen
Peter Rosen, director of the neo-conservative Olin Institute
for Strategic Studies (Harvard University) in mid-
2002: »The United States has no rival. We are militarily
dominant around the world. Our military spending
exceeds that of the next six or seven powers combined,
and we have a monopoly on many advanced and not so
advanced military technologies. We, and only we, form
and lead military coalitions into war. We use our military
dominance to intervene in the internal affairs of
other countries, because the local inhabitants are killing
each other, or harboring enemies of the United States, or
developing nuclear and biological weapons. A political
unit that has overwhelming superiority in military
power, and uses that power to influence the internal
behavior of other states, is called an empire. Because
the United States does not seek to control territory or
govern the overseas citizens of the empire, we are an
indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless. If
this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but
maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining
imperial order. Planning for imperial wars is different
from planning for conventional international wars. In
dealing with the Soviet Union, war had to be avoided:
small wars could not be allowed to escalate, or to divert
us from the core task of defending Europe and Japan. As
a result, military power was applied incrementally.
Imperial wars to restore order are not so constrained.
The maximum amount of force can and should be used
as quickly as possible for psychological impact – to
demonstrate that the empire cannot be challenged with
impunity. During the Cold War, we did not try very hard
to bring down communist governments. Now we are in
the business of bringing down hostile governments and
creating governments favourable to us. Conventional
international wars end and troops are brought back
(p. 10)
home. Imperial wars end, but imperial garrisons must be
left in place for decades to ensure order and stability.
This is, in fact, what we are beginning to see, first in
the Balkans and now in Central Asia. In addition to
advanced-technology weaponry, an imperial position
requires a large but lightly armed ground force for
garrison purposes and as reassurance for allies who
want American forces on their soil as symbols of our
commitment to their defense. Finally, imperial strategy
focuses on preventing the emergence of powerful,
hostile challengers to the empire: by war if necessary,
but by imperial assimilation if possible.«43
For about a year and a half the »new unilateralism«
(Charles Krauthammer) of the USA has been accompanied
by a political and political science grammar that
operates with the terms Empire and American Empire.
Politicians like Henry Kissinger spoke of it (»Empire or
leader?») or Patrick J. Buchanan (»A Republic, not an
Empire«), writers like Gore Vidal (»The last Empire»),
Tom Wolfe (»the mightiest power on earth, as omnipotent
as... Rome under Julius Caesar»), Norman Mailer
(»to build a world empire«) or Jerry Pournelle (»…
empires … have been the largest, longest-lasting and
most stable form of political organisation for most of the
world through recorded history«), journalists like Rothstein
(»An old idea transfomed. Call it Empire«) and
Maureen Dowd of the New York Times (»The Empire
Strikes First«) or Jay Tolson of the magazine U.S. News
& World Report (»Are we witnessing a smart-bomb
imperium?«), social and political scientists such as
Joseph F. Nye (»Not since Rome has one nation loomed
so large above the others.«), A. Etzioni (»Semi-Empire
«), Michael Ignatieff (»The Burden«) or Charles
Fairbanks of the Johns Hopkins University (»an empire
in formation«), historians like A. Schlesinger (»would
never be an empire«), Lewis Gaddis (»We are now even
more so an empire, definitely an empire«), Niall Ferguson
(»The Empire Slinks Back«) or Michael Hirsh
(»relatively benign power«), finally neo-conservatives
like D’Souza (»America has become an empire, a fact
that Americans are reluctant to admit«), Max Boot (»to
enlarge the ›empire of liberty‹«), Deepak Lal (»In
Defense of Empires«), William Kristol (»And if people
want to say we’re an imperial power, fine.«) or Charles
Krauthammer (»The fact is no country has been as
dominant culturally, economically, technologically and
militarily in the history of world since the Roman Empire
«). At the beginning of May 2003 the New York
Times counted that the term »American Empire« had
appeared nearly 1000 times in the news in the previous
six months.44 Donald Rumsfeld had a study done on the
subject of Empire,45 the German foreign minister Joschka
Fischer expressed disbelief46 and, finally, the President
of the USA47 himself – and he got an unheard echo
in tens of thousands of literally the same descriptions of
the United States that were varied at the demonstrations
on 15 February 2003.
The new concept
In the autumn of 2001 Max Boot of the Wall Street Journal
wrote an article »The Case for an American Empire
«48 in which he justified the military occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq with the stabilising effect British
domination had in this region in the 19th century. Since
this article appeared, the concept of Empire to characterise
a globus americanus has been spreading like wildfire.
In many and various ways attention is drawn to
America’s own colonial history and the first two cycles
in its attempt to create an American Empire (1898-1919
resp. in the era of Roosevelt’s »New Order«)49. In the
meantime, a core group of neo-conservative ideologists
has made »American Empire« as a political, to some
extent also as a scientific term to a battle-cry of their
own. »The logic of neoimperialism is too compelling
for the Bush Administration to resist … imperialist
revival«.50 Since then, the Empire debate has made
inroads into mainstream journalism, the discussions in
the political think tanks and, above all, the culture of
power. The »Global« that Clinton stood for has been
superseded by the »Imperial«.
The arguments of the supporters of the concept of Empire
is as simple as it is traditional. »We are the good
guys,« in the words of Max Boot. The USA is a »kind
hegemonic power«, a »benevolent empire« (Kristol).
Accordingly, a distinction must be made between good
and bad Empire. Empire carries within itself the potential
for good – e.g. it can link the imperious logic of
(p. 11)
security with the virtue of world betterment. Imperial
appropriation and protection of restive places creates
calm, order and security for the inhabitants of Empire
and for the natives being incorporated, to whom the
New Order also brings democratic values and institutions.
In areas like Iraq, American Empire is »the last
hope for both democracy and security«.51
Whereas Boot thinks the USA is destined for this role of
Empire, which is to be formally realized through the
UN, Mallaby advocates an independent corporate body
outside the UN under the leadership of the US. At the
same time Robert Cooper, a leading foreign policy advisor
to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, develops
the idea of »corporate empire«, to re-stabilise zones of
unrest (Afghanistan, Burma, Somalia, Colombia, Zimbabwe)
and to assure that the old British Empire
remains a player in the new game. »What is needed is a
new kind of imperialism, one compatible with human
rights and cosmopolitan values: an imperialism which
aims to bring order and organisation but which rests
today on the voluntary principle.«52
At the root of all the talk about American Empire is the
attempt to grasp the idea that America is no longer just
an exceptional super-, hyper- or hegemonic power.
Terms like these from the era of the Cold War and the
competition between the systems are now definitely
obsolete. What is needed is «the gorilla of geopolitical
designations«53 – Empire. The conceptual shift from
»hegemony« through »domination« to »empire« is significant
above all because the classical conception of
direct, permanent control by an imperial centre comes to
the fore. The »unipolar moment« after 1989 is supposed
to turn into a »unipolar era« (Krauthammer). Unlike the
imperia of history, it knows no »outside«. It is affected
by everything and considers everything its own. It is a
new order that is integrated through the nodes of global
networks, but their structure emanates from one centre.
The American Empire as Will and Idea is – still – only
an attempt to break out of the strategic constellation in
effect to date: Breakout. Resources, rhetoric, conception,
strategy and politics of the Empire camp are not
new. But now they are in power.
Translation: Joan Glenn
An updated and more comprehensive version (64 pages)
of this text in German can be found at
http://www.rainer-rilling.de/texte/american%20empire.
pdf
Prof. Dr. Rainer Rilling, Sociologist,
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation/Marburg University
Tel. #49(0)30/44310129, E-mail: rilling@rosalux.de;
www.rainer-rilling.de
(p. 12)
The Pentagon’s New Map
SO WHAT PARTS OF THE WORLD can be considered functioning right now? North America,
much of South America, the European Union, Putin’s Russia, Japan and Asia’s emerging
economies (most notably China and India), Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa,
which accounts for roughly four billion out of a global population of six billion. (…)
If we map out U.S. military responses since the end of the cold war, (see below), we find an
overwhelming concentration of activity in the regions of the world that are excluded from
globalization’s growing Core – namely the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans,
the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia.
That is roughly the remaining two billion of the world’s population. (…) If we draw a line
around the majority of those military interventions, we have basically mapped the Non-Integrating
Gap. (…) If a country is either losing out to globalization or rejecting much of the
content flows associated with its advance, there is a far greater chance that the U.S. will end
up sending forces at some point. (…) In many ways, the September 11 attacks did the U.S.
national-security establishment a huge favor by pulling us back from the abstract planning of
future high-tech wars against »near peers« into the here-and-now threats to global order. By
doing so, the dividing lines between Core and Gap were highlighted, and more important, the
nature of the threat environment was thrown into stark relief. Think about it: Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda are pure products of the Gap – in effect, its most violent feedback to the Core. (…)
But just as important as »getting them where they live« is stopping the ability of these terrorist
networks to access the Core via the »seam states« that lie along the Gap’s bloody boundaries.
It is along this seam that the Core will seek to suppress bad things coming out of the Gap. Which
are some of these classic seam states? Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece,
Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia come readily to mind. (…)
If we step back for a minute and consider the broader implications of this new global map, then
U.S. national-security strategy would seem to be: 1) Increase the Core’s immune system
capabilities for responding to September 11-like system perturbations; 2) Work the seam states
to firewall the Core from the Gap’s worst exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and,
most important, 3) Shrink the Gap. (…)
The Middle East is the perfect place to start. (…) This country has successfully exported security
to globalization’s Old Core (Western Europe, Northeast Asia) for half a century and to its
emerging New Core (Developing Asia) for a solid quarter century following our mishandling
of Vietnam. But our efforts in the Middle East have been inconsistent – in Africa, almost
nonexistent. Until we begin the systematic, long-term export of security to the Gap, it will
increasingly export its pain to the Core in the form of terrorism and other instabilities. (…)
But it all has to begin with security, because free markets and democracy cannot flourish amid
chronic conflict. (…) In my mind, we fight fire with fire.
Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, in: Esquire March 2003.
Barnett is a professor at the Naval War College in Newport and has been Assistant for Strategic
Futures in the Office of Force Transformation at the Pentagon since September 2001.
____________________________________________________
1 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
Washington 2002 (NSS); Preface George W. Bush, p. 1.
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html)
2 Quoted in G. John Ikenberry, Getting Hegemony Right, in: The
National Interest, No. 63 (2001)
3 Financial Times, 1 February 2002
4 James Kurth, Migration and the Dynamics of Empire, in: The
National Interest, No. 71 (2003)
5 Tony Judt, (Review) Its Own Worst Enemy, in: The New York
Review of Books, 15 August 2002
6 Walden Bello, Unravaling of the Atlantic Alliance? in: TNI Focus
on Trade, No. 81, September 2002
7 The Weekly Standard, 10 February 2003
8 S. William Hartung, Michelle Ciarroca, The Military-Industrial-
Think Tank Complex, in: Multinational Monitor 1-2/2003; regarding
the whole complex cf. the German website »Neue Weltordnung«
(New World Order) of H. J. Krysmanski [http://www.uni-muenster.de/
PeaCon/global-texte/globalsw0203.htm]
9 Irving Kristol is the publisher and co-editor-in-chief of The National
Interest, the main neo-conservative scholarly foreign policy periodical.
10 Cf. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, in: Policy Review 113
(2002), revised German version: Macht und Ohnmacht. Amerika und
Europa in der neuen Weltordnung, Berlin 2003. It is worth mentioning
that Kagan’s wife Victoria Nuland is the security advisor to Dick
Cheney.
11 William Kristol, who certainly should know, quoted from Joe
Hagan, President Bush’s Neoconservatives Were Spawned Right here
in N.Y.C., New Home of the Right-Wing Gloat, in: New York Observer,
28 April 2003
12 Cf. http://www.mediatransparency.org and Bruce Murphey, Neoconservative
clout seen in U.S. Iraq policy, in: Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, 6 April 2003
13 Quoted in Hagan, President Buch’s Neoconservatives [11]
14 Perry Anderson, Force and Consent, in: New Left Review 17 September/
October 2002, pp. 5ff.
15 Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great
Powers Will Rise, in: International Security 4/1993, pp. 5-51; Charles
Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, in: Foreign Affairs No. 70
(1990-91); Michael Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment,
in: International Security 4/1997
16 Cf. Jan Lodel, The Price of Dominance, New York: Council of
Foreign Relations Press, 2001; G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled:
The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca 2002; Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the world’s only
superpower can’t go it alone, New York 2002
17 Among the authors were Devon Cross, Cohen, Wolfowitz, Libby,
Bolton, Cambone and Zakheim (http://www.newamericancentury.org/
RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf). Cf. also a comparable report by
Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad (eds.), Taking
Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy
and National Security, Santa Monica [RAND] 2001 (http://www.rand.
org/publications/MR/MR1306)
18 pp. 2f.
19 NSS, p. 6 [1]
20 George W. Bush, »Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People«, Washington, 20 September 2001. A few days later
the former speaker of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives
Newt Gingrich: »There are only two teams on the planet for this
war. There’s the team that represents civilization and there’s the team
that represents terrorism. Just tell us which. There are no neutrals.«
Quoted from Steven E. Miller, The End of Unilateralism or Unilateralism
Redux? in: The Washington Quarterly 1/2002, p. 19.
21 »According to CBS information, notes taken by military personnel
who were with Rumsfeld during the attacks recorded his words:
‘best info fast. judge whether good enough to hit S. H’ – meaning Saddam
Hussein – although the reports of all intelligence services point
to Osama bin Laden as the person responsible for the attacks. ›At the
same time, not only UBL [bin Laden],‹ the notes record Rumsfeld’s
own words: ›Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not,‹ as
reported by CBS.« AP-Bay-Area.com 5 September 2002 and Bob
Woodward, We Will Rally the World, in Washington Post, 28 January
2002
22 Cf. Paul D. Hoyt: ‚Rogue States’ and International Relations,
speech held at the 40th ISA annual meeting in Washington, 16 – 20
February 1999. According to international law the possession of weapons
of mass destruction has nothing to do with an attack situation,
which alone would justify a preventive strike.
23 George W. Bush, »Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of
the US. Military Academy», West Point, NY, 1 June 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html
24 This terminology stems from Thomas P. M. Barnett, since 2001
Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation
of the Pentagon, cf. his article The Pentagon’s New Map, in: Esquire
3/2003. According to Barnett, of the 132 military interventions of the
USA in the past twelve years, 95% were in areas he calls »gaps«,
which (in his terminology) were either not ready or willing to couple
up to (US-American dominated) capitalist globalisation and in which
ca. 2 billion people live. This gap has to be closed by the military
»export of security«: »the basic argument that it is important for the
United States over time to-in effect-export security to those parts of
the world that lack internal regional security because it encourages
foreign direct investment by outside corporations.« (Barnett on 13
February 2003 in the Glen Mitchell Show; http://www.nwc.navy.mil/
newrulesets/Glenn%20Mitchell%20show.htm). Correspondingly: differentiated
procedures as well: multilateralism to safeguard the
»core«, selective bilateralism to safeguard the transition regions between
the core and the gap, pre-emptive unilateralism to reduce the
»gap« – the latter will be the »main objective of the security policy of
the USA in the 21st century«.
25 New York Times, 8 March 1992.The text showed the hand of Wolfowitz
and Libby. After it became known, the authors retracted it. The
PNAC report »Rebuilding America’s Defense« explicitly picked up
the thread where this draft left off.
26 Cf. Anthony Lewis, Bush and Iraq, in: The New York Review of
Books, 7 November 2002; S. Michael, T. Klare, Endless Military
Superiority, in: The Nation, 15 July 2002; Nicholas Lemann, The Next
World Order, in: The New Yorker, 1 April 2002; and Frances FitzGerald,
George Bush & the World, in: The New York Review of Books, 26
September 2002
27 NSS, p. 30
28 The Times of India, 26 September 2002
29 http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1/31/163455.
shtml
30 In the wording of the NSS: »The U.S. can no longer solely rely on
a reactive posture as we have in the past.« – »We cannot let our enemies
strike first.« – »We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to
the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.« – »To forestall
or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if necessary,
act pre-emptively.« – »We must build and maintain our defenses
beyond challenge« and »dissuade future military competition.«
31 Interview, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, 4 February 2002
32 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 March 2002
33 Cf. Stephen Blank, The Return of Nuclear War, ISA, Los Angeles
2002
34 Cf. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, Bloomington
1983; Pierre Hassner, The United States: the empire of force or the
force of empire? Chaillot Papers No. 54, Paris, September 2002, pp.
174
35 On 28 January 2003, cf. New York Times, 29 January 2003
36 Thomas P. M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney Jr., Global Transcation
Strategy, in: Early Bird Supplement, 30 April 2003
37 Quoted in Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, in: The New
Yorker, 1 April 2002
(http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/ ?020401fa_FACT1)
38 Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Pre-Emption and Exception: The US
Moves Beyond Unilateralism, in: S+F 3/2002, p. 136
39 Quoted in Frances FitzGerald, George Bush & the World, in: The
New York Review of Books, 26 September 2002; cf. also the website
of the Council for a Livable World http://www.clw.org
40 Berliner Zeitung, 5 February 2003
41 Spiegel-Online, 28 March 2002
42 Peter Rudolf, Wie der 11. September die amerikanische Außenpolitik
verändert hat. Bilanz nach einem Jahr, in: swp-aktuell 33, September
2002
43 Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future of War and the American Military,
in: Harvard Magazine 5/2002. Rosen worked at the Department
of Defense auf the National Security Council of the USA as well as at
the Naval War College and was one of the founding members of
PNAC.
44 New York Times, 10 May 2003
45 Cf. Thomas Powers, War and Its Consequences, in: The New York
Review of Books, 27 March 2003
46 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 March 2003
47 The remarks quoted at the beginning of this text were made
in Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002 (http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html) and in a speech to
veterans at the White House in November 2002.
48 Cf. The Weekly Standard, 15 October 2001, p. 27, and Max Boot,
The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American
Power, New York 2002
49 Cf. Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the
Prelude to Globalization, California 2003
50 Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed
States, and the Case for American Empire, in: Foreign Affairs 2/2002,
pp. 2-3, 6
51 Michael Ignatieff, The Burden, in: New York Times Magazine,
5 January 2003, p. 54
52 Robert Cooper, Why We Still Need Empires, in: The Guardian,
7 April 2002, p. 7, also in Ottawa Citizen, 5 May 2002, p. A14, quoted
in Ivan Eland, The Empire Strikes Out. The »New Imperialism«
and Its Fatal Flaws, in: Policy Analysis No. 459, 26 November 2002,
p. 4
53 Jonathan Freedland, Rome, AD … Rome, DC? in: The Guardian,
18 September 2002
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Svarog
Honorable
Supreme Hero
statue-loving necrophiliac
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posted September 04, 2004 02:41 AM |
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Note: Now damn it, girl! Too late for me to include your last one in my post. I just hope it doesnt disprove all I wrote.  Will read it later though (though i dont like readoing poetry much).
Truly an interesting read you provided us with, Peacemkaer. 
Now, concerning the topic in question, which political influences are most prominent in Bush policy? Firstly, I must say, the term “Bush policy” itself is giving too much credit to the man. That aside, I think that in order to address this question properly, I would have to go into the interests and influences that stand behind not only the GOP, but also those of the Democrats and the global US long-term strategical policy.
The main problem I have with fully complying with the apocalyptical Zionist theory is that I have substantional doubts about the number, power and potential to influence on events of those zealots, much less the highest level of US political decisions. To prove me wrong on this one, would be a disaster for America, and “Say hello to Americstan, the land of fundamentalist Christians”. Not that I don’t think religion itself is a powerful tool to exert influence. It is the opium for the masses, but not likely for the elitist leaders of a world secular superpower. (because in spite all the recent suspicious actions, you are still secular, remember?) However, the theories outlined there are not without a strong base. But I wouldn’t go too far in claiming that they are the one most influensive element of current US foreign policy. To me, they are just a minor fraction which incorporates well in the millitant-neocon-christian-corporate-interventionist-Jewish amalgam currently in effect as the national political agenda.
The single and most important piece of this hybrid political coalition, for me would be the lofty financial interests of corporates, successfully masked behind the ideology of neo-conservativism, and its historical mission to “spread democracy” around the world. The very same reason that lays behind Democratic interests and US national interests altogether, only masked with some other ideological profile this time (say liberalism?).
Since both the articles deal with the Israel thing so much, it is inevitable to address the question why US grips so stubbornly to a piece of desert land located in a hostile environment of militant Islamic extremists. No oil in there. Now look at this reason provided in the second article you posted (I suppose it’s written from a biased Republican or Democrat):
“As a nation, we have made a moral commitment, endorsed by half a dozen presidents, which Americans wish to honor, not to permit these people who have suffered much to see their country overrun and destroyed. And we must honor this commitment.”
How unserious it is for a serious political analyst to identify a reason for US almost dogmatic support for Israel on the basis of a historical promise and compassion? Even an outsider knows those thing don’t match well in the world of pragmatic politics.
The most reasonable motive for now (the fundamental apocalyptic theory aside), would be to believe that somehow the Jewish diaspora in USA still has an enormous influence on the strategic course of American policy, as it historically had over the past several decades. Now, I’m not in the position to assess their strength, and therefore I cannot say how realistic this scenario sounds, but it’s unlikely from a pure logical point of view that a foreign group of immigrants has more saying into political matters than the dominant citizenry of a country. Maybe the Zionist theories do hold water after all, as frighteningly as they sound…
But I don’t believe the previous administrations (among those Democrats) had such fundamentalist zealots in their ranks, and it is a fact that American involvement in and around Israel didn’t begin with the Bush administration.
Enough for now.
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The meek shall inherit the earth, but NOT its mineral rights.
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Consis
Honorable
Legendary Hero
Of Ruby
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posted September 04, 2004 07:10 AM |
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Edited By: Consis on 12 Feb 2005
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**Sigh**
Peacemaker, I feel very strongly that this thread belongs in Svarog's thread(especially after the light reading you gave us for homework) entitled, "Euro-American War". It can be found here:
http://heroescommunity.com/viewthread.php3?TID=12055
Edit: I rescind my opinion about China. I no longer believe WWIII will be China v. America.
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Roses Are Red And So Am I
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bjorn190
Responsible
Supreme Hero
Jebus maker
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posted September 04, 2004 02:18 PM |
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Quote:
I'm sure our capitolistic crimes against humanity will cause many nations to side with China but in the end who is to say? Pitting our theoretical crimes against photographs of Chinese torture jails and slave labor may cause other countries to side with us.
Uhm.. now where have I heard about torture jails before?.. Seriously, the USA blew its "moral law" superiority out the window when the pictures of the iraqi prisoner torture because international headlines. Real bad move there, goes right against the teachings of "the Art of War" actually, and decreases the power of the US.
However, If there is to be one dominant power in the world, USA comes in the top 4 of who I want to be there, together with Australia, Europe and Canada, and I wish you guys all the best. Nobody's perfect, not Europe, and not America, but we can work to better ourselves, and leave the bad things buried in the past.
On a more rational thought, the guy that accuratly predicted the fall of the Soviet Union has given USA 25 years until it falls, 20 if bush is re-elected. He was right the last time so hes probably right this time too (especially given the standard human behaviour of thinking that things last forever, and zealotly denying any sign of or need for change).
I hope that Europe will go on carrying the world if you fall, or that China becomes humane enough in that time to make it a good world for all of us. They're certainly changing to the better.
Maybe we can all rule the world together, as friends.
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Consis
Honorable
Legendary Hero
Of Ruby
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posted September 04, 2004 07:57 PM |
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Edited By: Consis on 12 Feb 2005
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Hmm, The Eldest Visions Of SugarPlums Dance Once Again
bjorn190,
I think your theories are based in sound logic, however I have a slightly different view of the future. If we look to history(as PrivateHudson faithfully does) we can clearly see that no great empire simply "falls" or stops. Great empires degrade over a long period of time from a combination of damning events. It isn't going to be one single thing that causes the U.S. to 'fall', if at all.
I have a few other ideas as well. I believe that Europe is not as unified as the american states are. Historically speaking, the european nations(France, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Yugoslavia(macedonia), Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, etc.) have always fought each other before going to fight outside the european peninsula(that's how I think of that land mass). What I'm trying to say is that the nations comprising the E.U. will not likely join together for political reasons. I've said it before and I still think that the E.U. is a bunch of wealthy bankers with visions of grandeur. The people of each respective country in that region truly do not have the same general ideas about the world and what's happening with it. I think Great Brittain has known this all along and has historically taken advantage of those european nations fighting amongst each other. Historically speaking, the Brittish are the smartest and know when to play devil's advocate; or whether to ally themselves with specific nations.
I believe that if the U.S. is defeated in any war, the world will see the continental american states break off to form their own governments while some might actually request to be annexed by some other country like Canada, Mexico, or Great Brittain. The Brittish would be fools not to be interested in staking claims to the resources available in this country.
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Roses Are RedAnd So Am I
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Wiseman
Known Hero
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posted September 04, 2004 10:31 PM |
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First I would like to point out that this is not a WWIII thread.
Secondly, Svarog America is by far the most fundamentalistic of all christian countries (i.e where
majority of population declares themselves christians),
and I think seizable amount of population ( which is duly represented by in higher spheres of politics) is
pretty much like it is decribed in that article.
How much inluence do they have as opposed to large corporations primarily interested in exploiting the middle-east oil is really debatable.
I just hope that bulk of Jewish people around the world won`t be punished for the crimes of the few wealthy conservative and influential ones.
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Truth may be out there, but lies are inside your head.
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Svarog
Honorable
Supreme Hero
statue-loving necrophiliac
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posted September 05, 2004 01:37 AM |
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Consis, this really has little to do with WW3. I dont know where you got that idea from. So, although I have much to say about you Chinese theories, I wont here.
Quote:
Secondly, Svarog America is by far the most fundamentalistic of all christian countries (i.e where
majority of population declares themselves christians),
I disagree. Fundamentalism is not measured by the percent of Christians in a country. However, there are some extreme Christian groups acting in US, more than any other country, but I dont think they have any important influence.
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The meek shall inherit the earth, but NOT its mineral rights.
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Wiseman
Known Hero
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posted September 05, 2004 03:30 PM |
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You misunderstood me.I didn`t say it was the most fundamentalistic because it has a large pecentage of Christians.
Like that article said :Though polls vary, a sensible figure is that, broadly defined, evangelicals compose roughly 35% of the population in the United States.9 A large portion believe that Satan meddles in world politics and promotes sinfulness and strife.
And like Noam Chomsky said:
Religious fundamentalists alone are a huge popular grouping in the United States, which resembles pre-industrial societies in that regard. This is a culture in which three-fourths of the population believe in religious miracles, half believe in the devil, 83 percent believe that the Bible is the 'actual' or the inspired word of God, 39 percent believe in the Biblical prediction of Armageddon and 'accept it with a certain fatalism,' a mere 9 percent accept Darwinian evolution while 44 percent believe that 'God created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last 10,000 years,' and so on. The 'God and Country rally' that opened the national Republican convention is one remarkable illustration, which aroused no little amazement in conservative circles in Europe.
Noam Chomsky
Z Magazine, February 1993
I don`t believe that the figures above are completely accurate but still...
s
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Truth may be out there, but lies are inside your head.
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Peacemaker
Honorable
Supreme Hero
Peacemaker = double entendre
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posted September 05, 2004 11:54 PM |
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Well, maybe we'd better hear this theory of Consis about WWIII being with China (or WWIV if one counts the Cold War which some do).
On what analysis do you base this theory? Do you find it related in any way to the neo-imperialist vision set forth in the RLS article above?
In addition, the regions of Southeast Asia and Northern Africa are experiencing a surge of fundamentalist Islamic incluences, in apparent backlash to the new US foreign policy. How do you envision our future relations with the regions of the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Northern Africa in light of these developments?
(Just a thought here -- I envision WWIII/IV as a multi-front war in one or more of these regions. Do you see China perhaps getting sucked into this type of a fray? Or do you not see larger conflagrations growing out of the current policy at all?)
Looking forward to your response, Consis (and any others), concerning these thoughts.
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bjorn190
Responsible
Supreme Hero
Jebus maker
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posted September 06, 2004 12:15 AM |
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privatehudson
Responsible
Legendary Hero
The Ultimate Badass
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posted September 06, 2004 12:40 AM |
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Quote:
I think your theories are based in sound logic, however I have a slightly different view of the future. If we look to history(as PrivateHudson faithfully does) we can clearly see that no great empire simply "falls" or stops. Great empires degrade over a long period of time from a combination of damning events. It isn't going to be one single thing that causes the U.S. to 'fall', if at all.
That's true yes, if we look to Rome, despite people's best efforts to say otherwise, many reasons brought about it's downfall such as corruption, barbarian invasions, overstretching the army, inclusion of barbarians in the army, weak rulers and so on. If we look to Britain, the reasons are many also, economic problems, changing world attitudes, reduction in British and European power after WWII, changing attitudes in Britain and so on. As you said, these events are part of a gradual process, the Roman empire declined over a few centuries, the British empire began to break up over a number of decades and so on. Empires that tend to collapse quickly are usually those won by the personal power and ability of one man such as Alexander (I'm not saying Greek/Macedonian power in those regions just disappeared, they didn't, but as a unified force it stopped pretty much the moment he died), Napoleon or Timur the lame. So in some respect, empires can collapse very quickly, though I doubt this could be the case in the US.
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We're on an express elevator to Hell, goin' down!
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Consis
Honorable
Legendary Hero
Of Ruby
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posted September 06, 2004 07:20 AM |
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Edited By: Consis on 12 Feb 2005
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The Theory Sits In Hibernation
Quote:
On what analysis do you base this theory? Do you find it related in any way to the neo-imperialist vision set forth in the RLS article above?
Yes.
I respect the opinions of bjorn190, Peacemaker, Svarog, and Wiseman. I think you all really do have excellent points. I also think that your views actually coincide with one another on different levels.
Svarog and Wiseman both agreed that this was not the WW III thread to be discussing such nonsense. To that I respectfully agree with you gentlemen.
In lieu of recent events(North Korea-withdrawal from peace talks), I believe South Korea is practically left helpless and the North Koreans are claiming our foreign policy to be an "untamed fire that will spread to darkest corners of the globe". American troops have been strategically withdrawn from South Korea supposedly to support the Iraqi rotation effort. (I posted a response to the news. It is the second post down from top in this thread:
http://heroescommunity.com/viewthread.php3?FID=10&TID=6261&pagenumber=84)
And will we see North Korea invade the south as before as the world knows it has always yearned to do? They may. They may not. That isn't the question. The question is China. Nuclear weapons or not, who is to say what we americans will do about all this? And what about Great Brittain? I do so wonder what the Chinese are thinking at this point.
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Roses Are RedAnd So Am I
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Wiseman
Known Hero
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posted September 06, 2004 05:27 PM |
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I think USA would threathen China with war if they thought of occupying South Korea.
For China to go into all-out war with USA it needs:
1.Economic and militay power on par with USA
2.For the Chinese people to be not only fully aware of the fact above, but a bit overconfident as well.In short
high morale and willingness for war.
For first it needs time, for second it needs a strong leader, someone a bit like Hitler.
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Truth may be out there, but lies are inside your head.
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Consis
Honorable
Legendary Hero
Of Ruby
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posted September 06, 2004 09:54 PM |
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Edited By: Consis on 12 Feb 2005
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Wiseman,
Quote:
I think USA would threathen China with war if they thought of occupying South Korea.
That's impossible to predict.
Quote:
For China to go into all-out war with USA it needs:
1.Economic and militay power on par with USA
2.For the Chinese people to be not only fully aware of the fact above, but a bit overconfident as well.In short
high morale and willingness for war.
China's economic power is now rivaling our own. DENG Xiaoping gradually introduced market-oriented reforms and decentralized economic decision making. Output quadrupled by 2000. China in 2003 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, although in per capita terms the country is still poor. Agriculture and industry have posted major gains especially in coastal areas near Hong Kong, opposite Taiwan, and in Shanghai, where foreign investment has helped spur output of both domestic and export goods.
Economically speaking, I understand your view that the american economy is far superior to the Chinese. Their GDP per capita is about 5000 while ours is around 37,000. It is logical to assume that our technological advances and superior economy should favor us on many aspects involved in a war with them. However, I simply cannot stress the unknown potential of both, a country's labor force and its available military manpower. China has little less than five times as many people and available military manpower than the U.S..
I believe China's military manpower and nuclear technology more than rivals our technology and economy. China is only slightly smaller than the U.S. with a population of 1,298,847,624 (July 2004 est.) vs. U.S. current population 293,027,571 (July 2004 est.). China's available military manpower is 379,524,688(2004 est.) vs. U.S. 73,597,731(2004 est.).
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Roses Are RedAnd So Am I
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Defreni
Promising
Famous Hero
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posted September 09, 2004 08:41 PM |
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Well kinda offtopic, but what is Chinas incitaments for invading Korea and/or Japan. Considering they havent invaded Taiwan yet, eventhough they often threaten to do just that.
Most FDIs (Foreign Direct Investment) in China comes from Japan and Korea, with a close third in Taiwan. So a war between any of these nations would result in economic disaster for the involved countries. One thing that China definetly is not interested in.
A more likely avenue of conflict for a war monging Chinese leadership (If such a one should arise) would be the South China Sea with its potential Oil ressources, this involves The Phillipines, Indonesia and Vietnam (Last war China had with Vietnam was in 1979, so that is not such ancient history). Or they could have another go at India, which they incidently have had 3 border clashes with in the 60ies. Or perhaps a look at the former Soviet republics in Central Asia which also have large Oil reserves.
My point is simply that it is very unlikely that China will attempt an attack on Korea or Japan even with 0 american troops stationed there.
This is not to say that China wont and dont use the weakened american presence in Asia for their benefits. Mostly when it comes to Taiwan and The South China Sea.
I havent even touched on the internal problems China is facing. Mostly with a more and more divided Country, betweeen the rich coastal provinces and the extremely poor inland provinces.
The Yale professor John Bryan Starr has written an excellent introduction to these problems "Understanding China: A Guide to Chinas Economy, History and Political Structure". If it has any interest.
Regards
Defreni
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Peacemaker
Honorable
Supreme Hero
Peacemaker = double entendre
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posted September 10, 2004 06:37 PM |
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Hm. Interesting.
However, I am with Defreni on his question. Wars are like crimes; while opportunity is necessary, there must also be a motive. I agree that achieving naval superiority is always a motivator for expansionist strategic decisions, but with one of the largest landbases and a Pacific coastline of approximately 5,000 miles, what leads you to the conclusion that territorial expansion would motivate China to engage in such a campaign?
There is little debate that the U.S. military is pretty much hands down the most powerful in the world. Given that China and the U.S. have established fairly strong economic ties and thus the accompanying interdependency, what are your thoughts on the benefit/cost analysis of China engaging in any campaign?
Also, how if at all do you see any involvement in the current U.S. foreign policy ideology I set out above?
My final question, for Consis and others, is: given our current stance against North Korea, how do you think the United States would react if China were to invade North Korea? Would we be with them or against them? Could we legitimately oppose a Chinese invasion of North Korea given our variously described justifications for invading Iraq? In other words, would not the nuclear threat alone justify such an invasion by China, assuming we are to be consistent, or are we the only nation with the moral right to engage in pre-emprive strikes?
(CAUTION: THAT WAS A LOADED QUESTION)
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Wiseman
Known Hero
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posted September 10, 2004 06:45 PM |
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On one hand it would be a load of America`s chest, and
on the other the idea of China strating to occupy anything is a big no-no in eyes of USA.Just an opinion though.
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Truth may be out there, but lies are inside your head.
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Consis
Honorable
Legendary Hero
Of Ruby
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posted September 10, 2004 11:12 PM |
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Edited By: Consis on 12 Feb 2005
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Peacemaker,
That is an excellent question you pose. All the news would suggest that China be reluctant to invade North Korea. They say that China is "dealing with border problems, trying to stop immigrants from coming into the country". We also hear about troop build-ups along China's southern border.
I find it interesting because of all the poverty-stricken peoples in both China and North Korea. If you ask me, only history can show that people who are oppressed into class-systems will inevitably rebel and revolt. I think that in many circumstances, governments have tried to quell uprisings by starting a war(wag the dog). Any war-politician can tell you that war is always good for the economy. During times of war people come together for a common goal more so than in times of rest(or unrest as is the case in China). On the one hand this country has the potential to become the greatest country with the highest workforce ever seen in any nation. On the other it has a good chance for civil disobedience, revolution, and the like.
My question still remains. Where will China be when the winds of change hit the people? Will the government "Wag the Dog" or will it bravely, courageously, and painfully move forward through liberation of its own peoples?
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Roses Are RedAnd So Am I
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Consis
Honorable
Legendary Hero
Of Ruby
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posted September 10, 2004 11:31 PM |
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Edited By: Consis on 12 Feb 2005
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Sorry To Post Extra
But I couldn't ignore the U.S. response to a Chinese invasion of North Korea.
It's already been done. It happened in 1953-54 to repel "MacArthur-led invaders".
If it happened today, the U.S. public would probably see the invasion as a blessing to the North Korean people. Our government would probably be a great deal more skeptical. The North Korean civilians have been brutally oppressed for so long that any invading country would be welcomed. In fact many North Korean people illegally immigrate to China every day.
All the evidence suggests that the people aren't happy. Civilians are being denied food, shelter, basic medical care, and more so that its military can receive the benefits instead. This country has little or no exports/imports. It's economy is quickly dwindling, the people are starving and dying, and the military gets all resources, technology, and benefits.
I don't know if a Chinese invasion would be more likely if they waited for the entire economy to collapse or for its leadership to start their internal assassination attempts(as done with Hitler) on themselves. In a case as bad as this I would say that collapse is imminent and invasion unlikely under current Chinese leadership.
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Roses Are RedAnd So Am I
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